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Unlocking the Courthouse Door: Removing the Barrier
of the PLRA’s Physical Injury Requirement to Permit
Meaningful Judicial Oversight of Abuses in Supermax
Prisons and Isolation Units
Michael
B. Mushlin*
Professor of Law,
Pace Law School

In the winter of 2001, Tyron Alexander and Kevin Carrol
were being held in a jail awaiting appearance in court when
they were involved in a fight with two prison guards.
Apparently no one was seriously injured, but Alexander
and Carrol were placed in an isolation cell.1 Aptly named
“the hole,” the cell, a “sparse” 64-square-foot space meant
to contain only one person, held no running water and no
toilet.2 At first both Alexander and Carrol were stripped of
their clothing and were naked. Later they were given boxer
shorts but no other clothing to wear. Instead of a toilet the
cell had a grate-covered hole in the floor that could only be
flushed by prison officials outside the cell. Carroll became
nauseated soon after being confined in the cell and was
forced to defecate into the drain, after which he was
allowed only one sheet of toilet paper for cleaning purposes.
Afterwards, the drain became obstructed with feces. Alexander and Carrol tried to clear the obstruction but were not
successful. No one helped them. When they had to urinate,
urine splattered from the clogged drain onto the cell floor.
The smell nauseated Carrol who then vomited into the
drain. When the guards finally decided to do something
they were unable to flush the drain. Nevertheless, rather
than release Carroll and Alexander from the contaminated
cell, the guards kept them confined. The guards then
instructed an inmate trusty to spray water into the cell
through an opening at the bottom of the cell door. But this
was a failure which only served to further spread the waste
across the floor. Desperate, Carroll and Alexander requested
a mop to clean the mess. The request was denied, and they
remained confined in the stench of the dirty, contaminated
isolation cell. Because they were not let out of the cell and
because it had no running water, Carroll and Alexander
could not wash their hands. When it came time to eat, they
were not given utensils. In this urine-, feces-, and vomitinfested cell prison officials served Carroll and Alexander
lunch and dinner. There was no bed but instead a concrete
protrusion from the wall with space for just one person. No
mattress or sheets or blankets were provided even though
the men were clothed only in boxer shorts on that winter
evening. That night in the cold they tried to sleep by sharing the small concrete slab.
After they were released Alexander and Carroll sued for
violations of their constitutional rights. Crediting all these

facts as true for the purposes of its decision,3 both the trial
court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
case must be dismissed nevertheless because of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act’s prohibition on suits that do not
involve physical injury.4
Steven Jarriett’s case was dismissed by the Sixth Circuit for the same reason.5 In 2006 Jarriett was involved in
a fight with another inmate. He was sent to the prison’s
segregation unit where he was placed for over thirteen
hours in a “strip cage,” a tiny two-and-a-half-feet square
enclosure with so little room that it was impossible to
recline and difficult to even sit. This was excruciatingly
painful for Jarriett, who had an injured leg. After his
release, he, too, brought suit. However, he lost for the
same reason as Alexander and Carroll: there was no physical injury involved in his suffering, and so his case was
barred by the Prison Litigation Reform Act.6
A third case involving Essam Mohammed Jameel
Najeed Adnan met a parallel fate.7 Mr. Adnan, for no
apparent reason other than the fact that he is an Arab
American, was placed in solitary confinement for more
than three months where he was shackled at his arms and
legs and let out of his cell for only three hours a week
although he had no violent history and had been classified
as a minimum security risk. These conditions had an
intense effect on Mr. Adnan. Following his release, he was
required to take three different anti-depressants. Prior to
this episode he had no history of mental illness. When
Mr. Adnan sued, the court held that he had presented a
valid claim for a violation of his constitutional rights, but
he was denied compensatory damages because he was not
physically injured during his stay in segregation.8
What these cases have in common is that each deals
with conditions in a solitary confinement or isolation or
segregation unit in a modern American penal institution.
What goes on in these units, which have dramatically
increased in number over the last thirty years, has enormous significance and has attracted the concerned
attention of national and international groups.9 These
cases also illustrate that the threat of abuse in these units is
quite high. Finally, what these cases have in common is
that in each the PLRA’s physical injury requirement was
invoked to terminate the plaintiff’s claim for compensatory
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damages. This is an intolerable result for a country that
prides itself on its embrace of the rule of law.
This article addresses this problem and calls for changes
that would remove the shackle of the PLRA’s physical
injury requirement, which prevents federal courts from
vindicating the rights of persons who are subjected to
unconstitutional treatment in isolation units in America.
The article has three parts. Part I provides a brief history
of the use of solitary confinement in the United States,
describes the current use of solitary, and outlines the dangers to human rights that are posed by the operation of
isolation and solitary confinement units. Part II describes
how the physical injury requirement of the PLRA, as currently interpreted by a majority of the courts, prevents
inmates from vindicating their rights. Part III is a call for
repeal or reform of the physical injury requirement. It
urges Congress to repeal the provision and provides reasons why it should do so. It also argues that, if the law
stays on the books, the courts should interpret this provision in a manner that is more faithful to the legislative
history of the PLRA, and in a manner that permits courts
to offer meaningful remedies for serious conditions
impacting inmates in solitary confinement units.
I. Isolation and Solitary Confinement in the
United States

The increased use of solitary confinement—or the isolation of a prisoner from other inmates and most social
contact—is one of the most pressing issues in American
corrections. The use of isolation has grown dramatically in
recent years.10 Currently, unprecedented numbers of
inmates are being held in isolation, solitary confinement,
or supermax units, as they are variously known. While the
numbers are greater than ever before, solitary confinement is not a new development. Indeed, this country was
the first to make solitary an institutionalized part of the
normal operation of its prisons. One might even say that
solitary as we know it was invented here.11 When the first
modern prisons were established, with the advent of the
Pennsylvania penitentiary system early in this history of
this country, solitary confinement was chosen as the
method best designed to lead to reformation of criminals.12 The theory was that a prisoner left alone in his cell,
isolated from harmful outside influences, would become
penitent through reflection upon his sins.13 However, it
soon became apparent that rather than becoming rehabilitated, prisoners kept under such conditions were actually
deteriorating mentally and had higher death rates than
other prisoners.14 Charles Dickens, perhaps the most
famous visitor to American prisons at that time, was
appalled by the impact of solitary on human beings. Calling solitary “a dreadful punishment” which inflicts an
“immense amount of torture and agony . . . which no man
has a right to inflict upon his fellow-creature,” Dickens
concluded, “I hold this slow and daily tampering with the
mysteries of the brain, to be immeasurably worse than any
torture of the body . . . .”15

Because of this failed experiment, solitary confinement
was rarely used and fell out of disfavor in the United
States.16 However, over the last thirty years, with the dramatic rise in prison populations, solitary confinement has
been rediscovered. Some trace the modern use of solitary
to its reinstatement at the federal prison in Marion, Illinois, following a prison riot in 1983.17 The supposed
success of that use at Marion sparked others to establish
their own solitary, isolation, or supermax facilities,18 and
the use of solitary has grown since then.19 While the
Department of Justice’s Bureau of Justice Statistics does
not offer statistics regarding the number of people in solitary,20 as of 2004 at least 25,000 prisoners were housed in
so-called “supermax” prisons where all prisoners are kept
in isolation.21 In addition, at least another 50,000 to
80,000—perhaps more—prisoners are in segregated
units in other prisons and jails.22
Conditions vary, but many isolated prisoners typically
spend between twenty-two and twenty-three hours per day
in cells that can be as small as six feet by eight feet.23 Prisoners typically are let out for only a few hours a week for
showers and exercise, are strictly limited as to what personal items or reading material they may retain, and are
often kept in windowless rooms that are in some units lit
twenty-four hours a day with fluorescent lighting, making
it difficult for the prisoner to even know if it is night or
day.24 Even time spent out of their cells is often time spent
alone, and prisoners are normally forbidden to talk to each
other through their cell walls.25 Prisoners may also be prohibited from having radios, televisions, or most forms of
reading materials.26 It is not surprising, therefore, that
when kept under these conditions for long periods of
time, prisoners may experience a number of psychological
problems and mental illnesses, including self-mutilation,
anxiety, panic disorder, difficulty in thinking and remembering, suicidal tendencies, depression, and impulse
control problems.27 Prisoners already suffering from mental illness before being placed in solitary fare even worse.28
Providing modern scientific support to the observations of Charles Dickens regarding the torturous nature of
this type of confinement, studies have demonstrated that
such isolation can have ruinous effects on individuals.29
One observer, for example, reported that 50 percent of
inmates who commit suicide are found within the 2 to 8
percent of those inmates housed in solitary.30
In addition, isolation units create an environment in
which additional abuses can and do occur.31 One need look
no further than the cases identified at the beginning of this
article for evidence that isolation/solitary confinement
units provide fertile soil for mistreatment and abuses of
prisoners. The treatment that Alexander and Carroll
received in the filthy strip cell and the suffering Jarriett
experienced in his small strip cage, and the prolonged,
unnecessary isolation to which Adnan was subjected are all
typical examples of the kinds of abuses that occur in solitary confinement units.32 As one observer put it, “Because
of the absence of witnesses, solitary confinement increases
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the risk of acts of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”33
Solitary confinement, as practiced in the United States,
has drawn the attention of observers both here in the
United States and abroad. On the national scale, one
example is the National Commission on Safety and Abuse
in American Prisons, which, in a comprehensive report on
conditions in American prisons, concluded that solitary
confinement should only be used as “a last resort.”34 The
report also recommended that prison systems be much
more careful about using solitary for inmates whose conduct did not justify it, and that even for situations where
solitary was needed that steps be taken to lessen the severity of the isolation by giving “prisoners in segregation
opportunities to fully engage in treatment, work, study,
and other productive activities, and to feel part of a community.”35 The Commission urged that prisoners with a
mental illness that would make them particularly vulnerable to conditions in segregation be housed in secure
therapeutic units rather than in solitary confinement.36
America’s use of solitary has also caused international
attention. For example, the Committee Against Torture,
the official body established to monitor compliance with
the International Convention Against Torture, a treaty ratified by the United States,37 expressed concern about the
severe isolation in America’s “supermaximum prisons.”38
In August 2011 the United Nations’ Special Rapporteur of
the Human Rights Council, in a report to the General
Assembly of the UN on torture and other cruel, inhuman,
or degrading treatment or punishment, pointing to extensive use of solitary confinement in the United States
found that prolonged solitary confinement, which it
defined as isolation for more than 15 days, violates the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.39
Despite all this concern, courts in this country have
been handicapped in their ability to fully address conditions in solitary confinement units in American prisons
because of numerous provisions in the Prison Litigation
Reform Act.40 One such provision is the physical injury
requirement to which we now turn.
II.

The Physical Injury Requirement

Despite the clear and present danger of abuse presented
by the extensive use of solitary confinement in the United
States, the physical injury requirement of the Prison
Reform Litigation Act, as currently interpreted, erects a
formidable barrier for persons who seek compensation
and vindication for the abuses that they have suffered in
solitary. That section provides, as a limitation on recovery,
that no prisoner may bring a federal civil action “for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a
prior showing of physical injury.”41 The majority of courts
have chosen to construe this provision to require actual
non–de minimis physical harm before they will even entertain a lawsuit for damages for abuses.42 Thus, “complaints
of exposure to unconstitutional prison living conditions”—
those that deny the “minimal civilized measure of life
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necessities”—without physical injury are considered to be
claims of mental or emotional injury for which compensatory damages are barred.43
The effect of this interpretation is that shocking cases
for damages for abuses in solitary confinement units are
dismissed without so much as a hearing. In the soiled
unsanitary strip cell in which they were confined, Alexander and Carroll suffered through a ghastly experience, but
because of the physical injury provision of the PLRA the
case ended. Jarriett was not just isolated for thirteen
hours; he was confined in a space too small for him to
even sit without “balling” himself up, much less lie
down.44 While he alleged that he had a bad leg and thus
experienced severe pain, the court found no physical
injury and so his claims for compensatory damages was
dismissed because of the physical injury provision.45
Finally, Adnan was held in absolute isolation and shackled without any justification, but here, too, the conditions
did not cause physical injury so his claim for compensatory damages was undermined by the PLRA.46 These
cases illustrate that the PLRA, with its physical injury
requirement, makes the assertion of a valid claim for
compensatory damages extraordinarily difficult, if not
impossible. Even when an inmate can claim some physical injury, courts will often term the injury de minimis and
dismiss the claim for damages.47 Courts in these situations have allowed for injunctions in cases in which there
is a need for equitable relief to enjoin further abuse.48
However, injunctions are often not available, and even
when they are they do not compensate for past harm.49
The most that is available under the majority view for
inmates who have been abused in solitary confinement
but did not suffer physical injury, and at the time the lawsuit is brought are not seeking injunctive relief,50 is
nominal damages and the possibility, remote though it is,
of punitive damages.51
III. A Call for Repeal or Reform of the Physical Injury
Requirement

The physical injury requirement, as interpreted by the
majority of courts, is an affront to the rule of law. With it,
conditions that would shock the conscience of American
sensibility are insulated from judicial review and go
unremedied. This would be a bad result in any setting, but
in the prison field where the lack of oversight is so glaring,
and the need for oversight so necessary,52 this is even
more intolerable. There are two solutions to this problem.
One is that Congress should repeal the physical injury
requirement. The other is that federal courts should interpret the provision to allow suits to correct abuses such as
those described in this article.
A. Congress Should Repeal the Physical Injury
Requirement

There is nothing in the legislative history of the PLRA that
justifies the physical injury requirement. As we have seen,
it interdicts otherwise valid constitutional claims. But there
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is no evidence that Congress actually intended to prohibit
“legitimate constitutional claims simply because the prisoner suffered no physical injury.”53 Rather, the legislative
history of the act, sparse though it is,54 demonstrates
clearly that what was on Congress members’ minds was
imposing some realistic checks on frivolous lawsuits by
prisoners who had nothing but time on their hands and
who used these suits as a way of distracting themselves
from the tedium of prison life,55 while draining public
resources needed to defend the lawsuits56 and diverting the
attention of prison administrators that could be spent on
better things. These concerns were not completely baseless. In 1993, a few years before the PLRA was enacted,
prison cases were a little over 40 percent of the appeals
filed in federal courts.57 Prison cases had also increased
dramatically in the district courts.58 Many members of
Congress believed that some of these suits, the overwhelming majority of which were filed and prosecuted pro se
without the benefit of counsel, were frivolous.59 Senators
took the floor in support of the PLRA decrying lawsuits
that were filed in response to “almost any perceived slight
or inconvenience”60 such as those involving claims over
bad haircuts, inadequate locker space, and “being served
‘hacked up’ cake.”61 In their zeal to weed out perceived frivolous lawsuits, however, Senators avowed that it was not
their intent to discourage prisoners from bringing “legitimate” and “meritorious” claims.62 One Senator, for
instance, guaranteed that the PLRA “will allow meritorious
claims to be filed.”63 In the words of one commentator who
reviewed the legislative history of the PLRA, “Senators
repeatedly claimed that the PLRA would not prevent legitimate constitutional claims from being litigated and
redressed.”64 With this background it is difficult to understand what Congress had in mind when it included the
physical injury component in the PLRA. Regardless, in
light of the overwhelming evidence that (1) the drafters of
the PLRA had no intent to close the courthouse doors to
legitimate meritorious cases, and (2) the physical injury
requirement of the PLRA, as currently interpreted by
courts, has had just that effect, there is nothing to lose and
everything to gain by repealing this provision of the PLRA.
B. Courts Should Interpret the Physical Injury
Provision in a Manner that Restores the Ability
of Courts to Remedy Constitutional Abuses in
Solitary Confinement Units

While repeal of the physical injury provision of the PLRA is
the cleanest solution, there is another method to provide
judicial oversight to address abuses in solitary confinement:
federal courts should construe the vague physical injury
provision65 not to exclude constitutional claims for compensation for abuses in solitary confinement units. Put another
way, claims for cruel and unusual punishment and procedural due process violations in solitary confinement units
such as those described in this article should be regarded as
constitutional claims that do not depend for their violation
on a finding of physical, emotional, or mental injury and

thus are not barred by the physical injury provision. Currently a majority of the courts have not followed this path.
They have read the physical injury provision of the PLRA to
bar any constitutional claim for compensatory damages that
an inmate asserts, no matter how valid it may be, if the violation of constitutional rights did not produce a physical
injury.66 This interpretation overlooks that constitutional
claims by inmates who are abused in solitary confinement
typically are claims which by their nature do not require
physical injury as an essential element of the claim. Eighth
Amendment claims for cruel and unusual punishment, for
example, are based on a finding of the objective seriousness
of the conditions to which an inmate is exposed. If these
conditions fall below “the minimal civilized measure of
life’s necessities,”67 or if they fail to meet the “identifiable
human need[s]” of inmates68and if they are imposed with
deliberate indifference69 to these objective needs, then there
is a constitutional violation according to decisions of the
Supreme Court, regardless of whether the conditions cause
physical injury. The basic protection of the Eighth Amendment, in other words, is not against just physical injury;
rather, it is protection against profound affronts to human
dignity.70 One need look no further than the abuses that
were inflicted on inmates at the notorious Abu Ghraib
prison to appreciate that cruel and inhuman punishment
can be inflicted without the necessity of proving actual
physical injury.71 The same is true for procedural due process violations that occur when inmates are subjected to
indefinite confinement in solitary confinement units without meaningful review.72 The injury that is protected
against here is the injury to liberty, which, of course, can
occur without regard to whether there is physical injury.
The majority interpretation of the PLRA thus cuts off
claims for compensatory damages for violations of this fundamental constitutional right. This, in the words of one
commentator, “[n]ot only . . . leave[s] the prisoner without
the ability to invoke the judicial power to protect his fundamental rights, but it also sends a powerful message to
prison authorities that they may engage in constitutional
wrongdoing without fear of judicial penalty.”73
A few courts have rejected this narrow approach, holding that the PLRA was not meant to bar constitutional
claims. A good example is Robinson v. Page,74 in which
Judge Richard Posner held that an Eighth Amendment
claim for exposure to asbestos unaccompanied by a claim
of physical injury is not barred by the PLRA. Judge Posner
observed that “[i]t would be a serious mistake to interpret
section 1997e(e) to require a showing of physical injury in
all prisoner civil rights suits.”75 This interpretation is more
in accord with the legislative history of the PLRA,76 more
in line with tort doctrine,77 and more respectful of the
essential role of the federal courts in our constitutional system of governance.78 It should be adopted by the courts.
IV.

Conclusion

The physical injury provision of the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, as interpreted by the majority of the courts,
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creates a barrier between the Constitution and solitary
confinement and isolation units in American prisons.
This is inconsistent with the rule of law and the admonition of the Supreme Court that there “is no iron curtain
drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this
country.”79 It, therefore, should be abolished either
through legislation or through judicial interpretation.
Notes
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